Europe is in a paradox; I’m not even talking about the war in Ukraine. But the insinuation is interrelated. This crisis dovetails with the inflationary pressure exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The commodity prices are through the roof as sanctions are gradually taking effect on the commerce between the European Union (EU) and Russia. The current snapshot of the European economy defines the contours of inflation in the region. While quantitatively similar, inflation in Europe is nuanced compared to the US inflationary profile. The US prices spiraled due to the easy money injected by the US government to wade off an economic crunch during the pandemic. The inflation in Europe, on the contrary, is pivoted on energy and food shortages. Thus, while the US expects a brief period of economic depression, Europe is staring into the abyss of staple shortages, supply chain snarls, and a significant risk to organic economic growth.
Recently, the EU lowered its 2023 growth projection to 1.4% – a contraction from the expected growth of 2.6% in 2022. Yet as annual inflation in the EU jumped to 9.6% last month – a multi-decade peak – the European Central Bank (ECB) has no choice but to turn hawkish. While the shift away from easy money is in accord with the aggressive outlook adopted by the US Federal Reserve, the EU faces complexities that the Fed would never confront.
The ECB delivered a surprise last Thursday as it hiked the interest rates for the first time in over a decade. The ECB increased the benchmark rate by a larger-than-expected increment of 50 basis points. The move has effectively settled the deposit rate – which had been in the negative territory since 2014 – to zero. However, the unprecedented scale has pushed the refinancing operations rate to 0.5%; the marginal lending rate to 0.75%. According to the ECB statement released on Thursday, the “larger first step on its policy rate normalization path” was taken to “support the return of inflation to the Governing Council’s medium-term target” and ensure that “demand conditions adjust to deliver its inflation target [vis-á-vis 2%].” The policy shift appears in tandem with the aggressive approach adopted by almost every developed economy around the globe – except for Japan. However, the nature of the ECB’s monetary tightening differs with respect to intrinsic factors.
A rate increase of a half percentage point is (frankly) not as aggressive when compared with the tightening schedule implemented by other advanced economies. Since May, The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has raised interest rates by 125 basis points – the fastest consecutive increments since 1994. The Bank of Canada hiked its benchmark interest rate by a percentage point last week – the single highest increase since 1998. And even the Bank of England (BOE) – once a constituent under the ECB – has increased its bank rate by 115 basis points – cumulatively in a series of rate hikes since December 2021. Evidently, the ECB is behind the curve – leading to the susceptibility of seepage of liquidity across the Atlantic. Yet, we need to realize one particular dimension, a distinctive quality that sets ECB apart from other central banks: it is responsible for setting the monetary policy for a chorus of developed (and developing) economies in Europe – not just a single advanced economy.
The ECB is the central bank of 19 European countries sharing the Euro as a fungible currency. A rate hike welcomed by stable economies like France could be detrimental to countries with unsustainable debt piles – like Greece, Italy, and Spain. Raising interest rates at the same pace as the US Fed – an implicit norm throughout the globe – could reignite the regional sovereign debt crisis as increasing borrowing costs would rapidly sink a few European nations into fiscal turmoil. Hence, the ECB has introduced a new tool, the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), to counter these “unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics that pose a serious threat to the transmission of monetary policy.” Nonetheless, the risk of fiscal fragmentation remains viable as the implementation criteria is ambiguous. For instance, the ECB claims that its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), governed under the TPI framework, would depend on the “severity of the risk facing fiscal transmission.” Thus, the ECB would be walking a fine line between fiscal consolidation and conducing fiscal irresponsibility. That line is particularly noticeable today. Following the ECB press conference on Thursday, yields on 10-year Italian bonds rallied; the Italian stock market trailed. All amid a political shuffle in Italy as Prime Minister Mario Draghi resigned for the second time in a week. Analyzing the volatile political atmosphere in Europe, I believe demarcating between the effects of sovereign fiscal incompetence and echoes of the ECB policies would be one of the most pressing challenges for the ECB in months to follow – perhaps second to the Russian threat to the European economy.
While the gas prices in Europe have shown some respite after a scare of blockade of the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline, the risk of retaliation still looms. The European Commission (EC) has directed a possible mandate for the EU nations to cut gas consumption (under their respective emergency plans) by 15% to prepare for a chilly winter without Russian gas. Nonetheless, countries like Hungary and Germany would almost certainly trip into a deep recession if Russia actually resorts to such a move. It increasingly seems likely! Gazprom – Russia’s state-controlled gas monopoly – retrospectively declared force majeure on deliveries from June 14th – capping potential gas supplies via the NS1 pipeline while safeguarding against litigation. Thus, further similar policy moves by the ECB – under the planned forward guidance – would be increasingly more difficult to enact as regional economies would increasingly suffer from stagflation – inching towards a steep recession.
Ultimately, the ECB announcement was not without a silver lining. The ECB has effectively managed to pump the Euro after it briefly fell to parity with the US dollar – for the first time in 20 years. But this is a temporary interlude as the future economic outlook of the EU spells gloom – from eroding consumer confidence to supply chain disruptions to high energy costs during bouts of sweltering climatic conditions. And therefore, I believe this confounding situation could culminate in only two scenarios: 1.) A miraculous end to the war in Ukraine, cessation of sanctions on Russia, and a subsequent end to the European energy crisis. Fantastical to even envision, I agree! 2.) A recession gripping more than half of the 19 nations of the EU – Germany leading the pack in mass economic deterioration.
Mitsuko Takahashi on the global egg industry
A Severe Economic Crisis in Lebanon: The Lebanese Pound Has Collapsed
The author is a political and economic analyst. He focuses on geopolitical policymaking and international affairs. Syed has written extensively on fintech economy, foreign policy, and economic decision making of the Indo-Pacific and Asian region.
Chabahar – The Ace Up Tehran’s sleeve
Top rights expert questions ‘double standard’ on Ukraine’s war displaced
Integration along the North–South Axis: Opportunities for Coupling
Ukraine: Prospects for end to war look bleak
The Year of ASEAN Centrality
Developing-8 ((D-8), is an organization for development cooperation among the following countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. The establishment of D-8 was announced officially through the Istanbul Declaration of Summit of Heads of State/Government on June 15, 1997.
The objectives of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation are to improve member states’ position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at the international level, and improve standards of living.
D-8 is a global arrangement rather than a regional one, as the composition of its members reflects. Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8) is a forum with no adverse impact on bilateral and multi-lateral commitments of the member countries, emanating from their membership to other international or regional organizations.
Ambassador Isiaka Abdulqadir Imam from Nigeria is currently the Secretary General of the D-8 Organization with its Secretariat based in Istanbul-Turkey.
The idea of cooperation among major Muslim developing countries was mooted by Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, the then Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, during a Seminar on “Cooperation in Development” which was held in Istanbul in October 1996. The group envisioned cooperation among countries stretching from South East Asia to Africa. Representatives from Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan attended the Seminar. This conference was the first step towards the establishment of D-8 and it was only after a series of preparatory meetings that D-8 was set up officially and began its activities with the Istanbul Declaration issued at the end of the summit of Heads of State and Government held in Istanbul on June 15, 1997.
Pakistan is active in D-8:-
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Ms. HinaRabbani Khar, called for creating a Private Sector Coordination Facility to boost economic cooperation amongst the Developing-Eight (D-8) countries. The Minister of State spoke virtually to the 20th Session of the D-8 Council of Foreign Ministers, hosted by Bangladesh today in a hybrid format.
The Minister of State called for creating a conducive environment for trade through facilitative legal frameworks, and equal opportunities for investment and business. She underscored that Pakistan’s vision of geo-economics had socio-economic growth, connectivity, and development at its core. Through cooperation and partnerships, the D-8 countries can realize their true economic potential. The Minister of State highlighted that Pakistan’s location afforded critical overland and maritime connectivity to key regions of Asia – Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and China – that made Pakistan geo-politically among the most pivotal states in the world. We were confident that through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), this geo-political asset will rapidly turn into a geo-economic dividend, she underlined.
The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, in his capacity as the Chair of the Council of Ministers, presided over the meeting. Foreign Ministers of Türkiye and Iran, and Minister of State of Nigeria, alongside senior officials from Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia, also participated in the meeting.
The Council meeting was preceded by the 45th Session of the D-8 Commission which adopted a series of major decisions building on the progress achieved. One of the key decisions taken by the Council was to fully operationalize the Preferential Trade Agreement by 31 October 2022 with a view to achieving the intra-D-8 trade target of US $500 billion agreed under the Decennial Road Map 2020-30.
In recognition of the role of trade in enhancing meaningful economic cooperation, and promoting financial and payment systems, the meeting also agreed to operationalize within the next two years, the D-8 Payment Card system, D-8 Clearing House, D-8 Qualified Industrial, and Economic Zones, D-8 Creative Economy and Financial Center, D-8 Halal Food Sector Cooperation, and D-8 Barter Trading System.
The Ministers agreed on the need to enhance financial and human resources for the D-8 Secretariat. The meeting also tasked the Secretariat to further review project proposals for financial support by the D-8Member States.
The Meeting acknowledged with appreciation the desire of the Republic of Azerbaijan to become a member of the D-8. The Ministers agreed to hold a Special Session of the D-8 Commission in October this year to make final recommendations with regards to the criteria for the accession of new Member States to the D-8. A report to this effect will be considered for adoption by the next Council of Ministers Session.
The D-8 Group, established in Istanbul on 15 June 1997, includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Year 2022 marks the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the establishment of D-8.
A convergence of interests (read: opposition to the U.S.) is bringing Iran, China and Russia closer together than ever. As their relations with the West deteriorate, Russia and China are seeking to rewire global power flows in ways that will work to their advantage. Iran’s integration into the China–Russia Eurasian architecture is as complicated as it is consequential for economic and security relations across Eurasia. As Beijing and Moscow seek to advance their respective strategic objectives while cooperating within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework, Iran’s integration carries the potential to shift the strategic balance between the two. Iran has for long struggled, both economically and geopolitically, due to persistent sanctions imposed upon it, and the hostile attitude it has faced from the U.S. and other Western countries. However, a silver lining has recently arrived in the form of the commencement of operations at the Chabahar Port. Located in south-eastern Iran at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman, the Port is blessed with an ideal strategic location connecting the Indian subcontinent with both Afghanistan as well as Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The Chabahar Port offers significant reductions in both cost and shipping times for goods and cargo for trade between India and Afghanistan, as well as for trade between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia. Likewise, the International North – South Trading Corridor (INSTC) offers a much quicker multi-modal transportation route for trade with Europe. The INSTC contributes to Moscow’s strategic imperative to preserve its influence over the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea basin. The increase in trading speed for consignments between Europe and India could be between 50 and 100% as compared to the traditional route along the Suez Canal. Thus, the development of the Chabahar Port has allowed Iran a lifeline to emerge as a hub of regional trade through promoting these maritime trading operations. Iran’s strategic position at the heart of Eurasia’s southern rim also makes it the geographic pivot in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Iran’s ability to project power through Afghanistan had been held in check by the presence of U.S. forces in the country, but the U.S. withdrawal and the accompanying power vacuum left Iran with new ways to exert leverage, both diplomatically and through proxy militant groups, from Afghanistan into Central Asia.
With the hesitancy of Central Asian states like Kazakhstan to support Russian efforts in Ukraine, Moscow’s role in the region is much more in doubt. Iran has wasted no time in attempting to build consensus around longer-term commitments to the Chabahar Port as a primary trading hub. At a recent India-Central Asia summit, all the countries involved agreed on the need for strengthening both economic and diplomatic ties. Iran and India have committed to providing Central Asian countries a stake in the Chabahar Port, setting aside dedicated areas for their trading operations. Simultaneously, an agreement was reached to simplify customs processes and rules to ensure more efficient and unhindered movement of goods. Kyrgyz officials have stated that transit duration for goods between Kyrgyzstan and India could be reduced from its current duration of 30 to 45 days to just two weeks if the Chabahar Port is used. These imminent changes bode very well for Iran as the establishment of newer trading routes, with Chabahar as the dominant hub will bring both prosperity as well as diplomatic leverage for Iran over Central Asia.
The emergence of Chabahar is significant, primarily because it unlocks trading routes that were previously unviable. A large part of this earlier blockage has been on account of Pakistan’s chronic attempts to damage India by blocking its trade routes through Afghanistan. This has historically provided Pakistan with nuisance value vis-à-vis Afghanistan and was aimed at boosting Pakistan’s own trade with its northern neighbor, as well as granting immense diplomatic leverage to Islamabad over Kabul. This blockage, however, has offered Iran an opportunity to establish itself as a regional hub for trade by offering Afghanistan a solution to the Pakistani obstruction, which was choking off its trade routes and crippling the development of its nascent economy. The U.S. withdrawal and the accompanying power vacuum left Iran with new ways to exert leverage, both diplomatically and through proxy militant groups, from Afghanistan into Central Asia.
The Chababhar Port now exists in contradistinction to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, which Pakistan hoped would emerge as a regional powerhouse. Geographically, though the Gwadar Port is viable, its location in an inhospitable region has proved a problem. Even more centrally, Pakistan made the error of alienating its own local population in Balochistan by excluding the people from the benefits of Gwadar’s development. As a consequence of these unforced errors, the Gwadar Port rests on weak foundations both financially, in the form of unserviceable Chinese debt and operational issues, as well as functionally in terms of difficulty handling insurgency.
This sequence of events has benefited Iran, as it has acquired some measure of regional dominance and leverage vis-à-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s obstructionist approach to trade in the region has left it isolated in both the diplomatic and geographic senses, and with Chabahar offering Afghanistan an alternative route, much of Pakistan’s own trade with Afghanistan and hopes for its Gwadar Port have been dealt severe blows. At a time when Tehran has largely been globally isolated and has battled against persistent sanctions, the Chabahar Port has allowed it a golden opportunity to position itself as a hub for regional trade and has gained it a measure of ascendancy in relation to its neighboring Central Asian countries, as well as with reference to Pakistan and Afghanistan. These developments may herald an era of improved competitiveness and economic viability for Iran’s economy and regional heft.
We build too many walls and not enough bridges.–Isaac Newton
Global economy is currently going through a period of rising integration, with the new platforms emerging that assume transcontinental scale, becoming the principal source of global markets opening up. However, in spite of the positive effects that such new platforms have in store for the openness of global economy, this process also entails intensifying competition between and polarization of these blocs along the North–South axis. In 2022, this opposition was increasingly noted between BRICS and G7, the leading blocs of the Global South and the Global North. Amid these conditions, it is very important to design mechanisms for interaction and cooperation between platforms representing developed and developing nations—already at the early formative stages of large-scale blocs.
For developed nations, coupling the platforms of the Global North with those of the Global South is not so much a matter of assisting the developing world—it is more a matter of maintaining and stepping up the pace of their own economic growth in competition with the Global South since “catching-up development” of developing countries helps them grow faster than developed nations. The principal potential for growth of the global economy rests with the developing world. Moreover, these countries harbor the greatest potential for reducing tariff barriers as part of forming their integration platforms. This prompts increasing competition for platforms in the most dynamic regions of the developing world, as is exemplified by the exacerbating competition between the U.S. and China in Asia-Pacific.
The nations of ASEAN make the acute competition between Beijing and Washington particularly obvious. This regional bloc exhibits one of the best dynamics, both in its pace of economic growth and in building a ramified network of economic alliances in global economy. Besides, ASEAN is a hub of innovations and new integration areas—largely, due to economic agreements on digital economy, with Singapore as the acknowledged leader. With ASEAN states increasingly involved in economic cooperation both with developed nations (such as interactions along the ASEAN-EU axis) and developing economies (Cambodia as an ASEAN representative taking part in the 2022 BRICS+ summit), this regional integration may become the pivotal factor in coupling integration projects of the North and the South.
At the same time, we should note that the acute North–South competition could require certain consistency on the part of developing countries in their strategy of forming integration platforms. So far, integration in the developing world is significantly fragmented as compared to similar processes across the developed nations. “Deficiency of integration” is particularly noticeable in Eurasia, where several states remain outside the perimeter of key regional integration blocs or international organizations, such as the WTO. Given this, developing countries should primarily gear up for building a common platform within the Global South, achieving this over the next few years. The 2022 BRICS+ summit held as part of China’s BRICS presidency became an important step to attain this goal. This summit was attended by representatives of the largest integrations of the developing world, which creates premises for further steps toward a broader cooperation platform.
A common platform for countries of the Global South will significantly increase capabilities of developing countries for building more active and equal platforms of interaction with developed nations. The weightier the trade alliance formed by developing nations, the more countries of the Global North will lose in consequence of trade restrictions against the Global South. With little progress attained by the developing world toward such common platforms, developed nations will most likely interact with individual regions and blocs of the developing world on the basis of conditionality. In this case, developing nations that are building a number of global alliances should prioritize their own platforms while building interactions with integrations of the developed nations later on.
While following a certain sequence in building economic alliances, developing countries may significantly increase the openness of their regional blocs—both for other developing nations and for integrations formed by developed economies. Simultaneously, integration blocs of the Global North should be as open to mutual connections as platforms of the Global South. So far, such a connection is in evidence; on the contrary, we stand witness to growing polarization and competition between the platforms established. For instance, such platforms as Global Gateway or G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) are positioned as competitors of the Belt and Road Initiative. After the G7 summit of 2022, leading developed nations announced they would be earmarking up to USD 600 bn. to implement connection projects in developing countries. This funding is less than the existing funding in the Belt and Road Initiative, and it does not stipulate mechanisms for coupling with the relevant initiatives of the Global South.
New formats: R20 and BRICS++
Importantly, integration platforms that incorporate both developed and developing states are also emerging amid growing global economic competition for integration platforms. Such groups may serve as bridges between the North and the South. This primarily applies to such largest integration groups as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and such forums as G20. Yet, for these venues to play their role in connecting the platforms of the North and the South, they need additional mechanisms of inclusivity. For the RCEP, these could be provisions on admitting new states and on interacting with other regional groups.
G20 could achieve greater inclusivity through a platform for interactions between regional groups, of which G20 states are members. The Valdai Club proposed this format in 2018, dubbing it R20 (the Regional 20). With a platform for interaction between regional blocs in place, it would be possible to significantly expand cooperation between the global economic heavyweights and smaller economies, which are regional partners of the largest states. Moreover, extending G20’s format of interaction to the regional partners of the group would overcome one of its key problems and limitations—namely, insufficient representation and lack of legitimacy in empowering all constituent nations of the global economy. It is also important that the R20 format would allow for a more efficient coordination of global and regional anti-crisis steps, providing a better venue for interactions between the regional projects of the North and the South.
On the other hand, the BRICS+ platform, which is currently formed by the Global South, does not so far envisage mechanisms for interacting and connecting with developed states. If BRICS+ opts to develop along the lines of admitting only developing G20 states to its core, that will not provide an impetus for developing the BRICS+ format toward the required inclusivity and will not be conducive to meaningful connections between the platforms of the North and the South. If BRICS+ gears its development toward G20, this trend may also undermine the focus of developing countries on their own agenda and on their own platforms of integration. The very G20 platform, despite several achievements in advancing the global agenda, is still far from being properly inclusive and efficient in coordinating the anti-crisis steps taken by the global economy’s largest states.
A more promising course apparently lies in creating a special format for interactions between developed and developing states within BRICS++. Such a format could include interactions between BRICS+ and individual developed states or developed states’ regional groups, including the EU or EFTA. The perimeter of the BRICS++ format could also include joint blocs and forums of the North and the South, for instance, the RCEP. Additionally, along with regional integration blocs, BRICS++ could also include North–South interactions within regional and global development institutions. Ultimately, BRICS++ could acquire a global scale by connecting projects of developed and developing states and becoming a platform for a new stage in globalizing the world economy. This platform could become an important addition to global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and such forums as G20 where developed states thus far largely play a dominant role.
India’s and Africa’s key role
India and South Africa may play an important role in developing the North–South ties and in the evolution of BRICS+ toward greater openness and inclusivity. Representing the developing world in such projects as the emerging system of economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, India may also become a key factor in connecting the platforms of the North and the South. India could also be instrumental to security dialog between the nations of BRICS and the developed states that are members of the QUAD
As for BRICS+, this format could give India an opportunity to advance its own platforms and projects, including North–South transportation corridor projects in addition to China’s initiatives aligned along the West–East axis. For India, BRICS+ could serve as an instrument of influencing the further development of BRICS (including China’s) ties with other states of the Global South. Without being actively involved in shaping the development agenda of BRICS+, India loses an important tool for advancing its national interests in building common platforms of the Global South. In this context, it is important that, instead of abandoning BRICS+ as such, India should formulate its own concept and vision of this platform.
India could also make interactions within BRICS+ more pragmatic economic affairs by developing cooperation between BRICS New Development Bank and other regional development institutions (NDB+), and the same applies to expanding the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement’s (CRA+) mandate and enhancing its role. BRICS++ may also carry major opportunities for India that could use its accumulated political capital in its relations with the leading developed states with a view to connecting developed states’ key projects (B3W, Global Gateway) and the global South.
Africa can play a no less important role in BRICS+ and in connecting the platforms of the North and the South. Among all the pan-continental blocs of the developing world, Africa was the first to create a continent-wide free trade area, and this platform can play a key role in the “integration of integrations” with developing states of Asia and Latin America. Connecting such integration projects as the African Union (Africa), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the expanded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO+) could serve as the foundation of a common platform of the Global South. Here, Africa is the key link in the “integration of integrations” in the Global South since it already has a number of agreements with other regional blocs in the developing world. Particularly, the African Union and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) held their first summit in September 2021.
Given that Africa exhibits a high concentration of such global issues as the food problem, the energy problem, and the debt problem, Africa could also become the region where joint projects run by the development institutions of the North and the South overlap. Transportation connection projects, developing the “green agenda” element of sustainable development, and combating pandemics could become important areas of interaction between development institutions of developed and developing countries. The African Union can also play a more significant role in transforming the global economic architecture in the format of interacting regional integration blocs. In this regard, close attention should be paid to increasing the African Union’s representation in global international organizations along with the established representation of leading regional blocs formed by developed states. As Africa’s key regional platform, the AU should become a systemic participant in G20 discussions along with the EU.
In July 2022, the African Union marks its 20th anniversary. Over this time, much has been achieved in advancing the interests of African states in international forums and multilateral economic organizations. The African Union, of all the Global South regions, achieved significant results in consolidating the pan-continental agenda and in building interactions with regional blocs formed by developed states (primarily the EU) and by the developing world. In 2023, South Africa will assume presidency in BRICS, and in 2025, the chairmanship in G20. It is possible that in the nearest future, it is Africa and the African Union that will be able to play the key role in transforming the global agenda of the North and the South along the lines of resolving global problems and building greater interactions between developed and developing states.
Today, there is both a need and a possibility to couple integrations of the North and the South. However, it requires new mechanisms of cooperation within global forums such as G20, including cooperation between regional integration blocs of the North and the South. Besides, it is necessary to transform the largest regional blocs along the lines of greater openness to “integration of integrations” and the possibility of connections with other regional blocs. Countries of the Global South should be more active in creating common platforms for economic cooperation. In the last few years, developing countries’ prerequisites for creating such mega-platforms have significantly improved. The developing world inaugurating a common integration project will, in turn, see more favorable conditions for constructive cooperation between—and connection of—the platforms of developed and developing states. As of yet, integrations of the Global South are far from the degree of connectedness and structuredness typical of developed states’ integration projects. As the “integration gap” in the global South is overcome, this space will form conditions for stable and balanced connections between platforms of developed and developing states. The African Union and India (by being more actively involved in shaping the agenda of BRICS+ and BRICS++) may play the key role in these processes.
1. Andrey Kortunov analyzed the prospects of building security interactions between BRICS states: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-06-23/Can-BRICS-make-a-contribution-to-international-security–1b43c79r4U8/index.html
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